Regulatory institutions play an important role. French wage-fi xing mechanisms, with a legal national minimum wage (the so-called 'SMIC' -see Gautié 2010) , which is relatively high compared to the median wage, as well as the legal extension of collective agreements, limit the possibility for fi rms to adopt 'social dumping' strategies based on wage cuts. Employment protection legislation (EPL) is also important, because it shapes fi rms' choices in terms of hiring and dismissals. According to the OECD index, EPL is at a fairly high level in France in comparison to many other countries. This may explain why the (short-term) elasticity of employment to economic activity is lower than in more 'liberal' countries, such as the United States or the United Kingdom. But a high level of EPL is also usually correlated with a high proportion of temporary workers (OECD 2004) and, therefore, a higher degree of dualism between 'insiders', on relatively protected permanent contracts, and 'outsiders', on temporary contracts which play a role as an adjustment variable during economic downturns. Indeed, the share of temporary workers among all employees amounted to about 13 per cent in France at the beginning of 2008, and during the fi rst fourteen months of the crisis (April 2008-June 2009) more than half of all job losses were concentrated on temporary agency workers.
But France is also characterized by a high level of 'social protection' -including labour market policies -and this should limit the social impact of the crisis in terms of employment and, above all, income. But one must scrutinize the coverage and entitlement rights of diff erent categories of people to assess the degree of inclusiveness of the social protection system. Social dialogue may also play a role in the way the crisis aff ects inequalities, depending on how unions and employers take into account the interests of diff erent categories of workers. Unionization is low in France (about 5 per cent in the private sector), and unions are weak and often divided at the fi rm level. Social dialogue is usually more vivid at industry and national levels, and unions also play a role in the social protection system, in particular in the governance of the unemployment insurance system. France is also characterized by a complex interplay between the social partners (unions and employers' organizations) and the state, which impacts notably on labour market policies and regulations, as well as on social policies.
All these features may contribute to an explanation of the outcomes of the crisis in terms of employment and incomes.
Section 2 presents the main symptoms of the crisis, in terms of growth and employment (at both global and industry levels). Section 3 assesses its impact on employment and unemployment inequalities, as well as on job quality -although the latter is harder to assess, because of lack of data. Section 4 turns to inequalities in wages and incomes, and Section 5 assesses the role of public policy and social dialogue. In Section 6 I present two case studies that illustrate the unequal impact of the crisis in terms of employment and compensation: the fi rst focuses on short-term compensation schemes, the second on measures taken in favour of temporary agency workers. Section 7 presents some concluding remarks.
ANATOMY OF A CRISIS: THE BASIC FACTS

Then Came the Storm
After the slowdown of [2002] [2003] , France recovered and experienced annual growth of about 2 per cent, on average, during the next four years. 1 This recovery induced a fairly large increase in employment: about 850,000 jobs were created between the beginning of 2005 and the beginning of 2008, and unemployment fell to its lowest level since 1983 (7.2 per cent).
France was hit by the crisis from the second quarter of 2008, and the bottom was reached during the fi rst quarter 2009. Overall, GDP collapsed by -3.4 per cent during the downturn (from the peak 2008 Q1 to the bottom 2009 Q1), which was less than in Germany (-6.7 per cent from peak to bottom), Italy (-6.5 per cent) and the United Kingdom (-5.7 per cent) . During the whole period covered here (beginning of 2008-beginning of 2010), household demand remained fairly stable during the period, limiting the negative impact on GDP, whereas household investment (about -14 per cent between 2008 Q2 and 2010 Q2), exports (about -14 per cent between 2008 Q2 and 2009 Q4) , and private sector investment (about -10 per cent between 2008 Q2 and 2010 Q2) collapsed.
The impact on unemployment was signifi cant: the unemployment rate rose from 7.2 per cent at the beginning of 2008 to 9.5 per cent at the beginning of 2010 -see also below -and the number of unemployed increased by 690,000 during this period (2008 Q1-2010 Q1 , that is, a 34 per cent increase).
Impact on Diff erent Sectors and Firms
The manufacturing and construction sectors were the hardest hit by the crisis in terms of employment in annual terms. Cumulated job losses in the manufacturing sector from the beginning of 2008 to the end of 2009 amounted to about 255,000 -that is, about 8 per cent -with a peak in job losses during the second and third quarters of 2009. In the construction sector, employment continued to increase until the fourth quarter of 2008, then declined continuously until the end of 2009 -there were more than 45,000 job losses during that year, about 3 per cent. Eventually, in the service and trade (competitive) sector, the decline in employment was less pronounced -about 231,000 job losses, less than 3 per cent -and the level of employment started to rise again during the last quarter of 2009.
It should be noted that, in these fi gures, temporary agency work is not counted in the utilizing sectors, but in the 'temporary work agencies' subsector, which is included in the service and trade sector. As a consequence, the eff ective decline in the actual number of employees was higher (and faster) in the manufacturing and construction sectors -where the number of temporary agency workers was particularly high before the crisis (see also Section 3.1) -than indicated here.
The negative impact of the shock was also diff erentiated according to fi rm size. The number of bankruptcies was higher among small and medium-sized fi rms: it increased by 52 per cent between 2008 and 2009 among fi rms with 50 to 200 employees, while it decreased (-28 per cent) in fi rms with more than 200 employees (Jeanneau 2010 ).
IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT AND UNEMPLOYMENT INEQUALITIES: THE CONSEQUENCES OF A DUALISTIC LABOUR MARKET
Inequalities in the Risk and Manner of Losing One's Job
Temporary work as adjustment variable
Since the mid-1990s, the proportion of temporary agency work has increased continuously and dramatically (up by about 120 per cent in the whole economy, full-time equivalents -see Figure 5 .1). 2 Even though their number increased most in the trade and service sector, temps are concentrated mainly in the manufacturing and construction sectors, the sectors hardest hit by the crisis. In 2007, the shares of the manufacturing sector and the construction sector, respectively, in temp agency employment was about 45 per cent and 21 per cent, while their shares in total employment in the competitive sector were only about 20 per cent and less than 9 per cent, respectively. Overall, the share of temps among employees amounted to about 7.5 per cent of the whole workforce in the manufacturing sector, and up to 8.8 per cent in the construction sector in 2007 (see Table 5 .1).
The increasing use of temporary agency work is the result of changing company strategies and human resource management practices in the Jérôme Gautié -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:22:04PM via free access past 20 years (Liégey 2009 ). Many fi rms decided to concentrate on their core activity and to externalize other activities. The subcontracting ratemeasured by the share of the expenses of subcontracting in the turnover of fi rms -doubled between the mid-1980s and the mid-2000s, from about 4 per cent to 8 per cent. Even small and medium-sized fi rms were aff ected: the share of fi rms with fewer than 100 employees that subcontract part of their activity grew from 56 per cent to 86 per cent during the period. France, 1995 France, -2007 France, (fulltime equivalents, in thousands, upper fi gure, 1995 Subcontractors bear the blunt of fl exibility and therefore use more temporary contracts. At the same time, many fi rms adopted 'just-in-time' and 'lean' production processes, which require higher reactivity and therefore more fl exibility. As a result, dualism did not increase only between fi rmsbetween (larger) fi rms and their (often smaller) subcontractors -but also within fi rms, between the core workforce and the peripheral workforce, usually younger and less skilled. As a result of the various forms of externalization, fi rms were able to decrease the volatility of both their value added and profi ts -while the volatility of their activity did not decline: according to Liégey (2009) , since the beginning of the 1990s, at the macro level, there has been a fairly good correlation between the decline in volatility of value added and profi ts, on the one hand, and the increase in temp agency work on the other.
Due to all these changes, temporary agency work served as a buff er when the crisis came. Firms, especially in manufacturing and construction, reacted to the crisis by rapidly cutting the number of temps (see Figure  5 .2) which accounted for more than half of the total employment decrease between the beginning of March 2008 and the end of June 2009.
Internal fl exibility for permanent workers
Many fi rms tried to implement internal fl exibility devices. The short-time compensation scheme, so-called 'partial unemployment', is one of them (for the French experience in a comparative perspective, see Bosch 2009 and Erhel 2009 ) -that is, a reduction in working time and wages, partially compensated by a public subsidy. 4 In order to facilitate the use of partial unemployment, a new tripartite national agreement was adopted at the beginning of 2009 (see Section 5.2, and also case study 1 in Section 6.1). To get the subsidy, a fi rm must seek authorization from the Ministry of Labour, which fi xes the number of hours compensated. The number of authorized hours to be compensated by the state (Figure 5.3) 5 and the number of workers concerned ( Figure 5 .4) increased dramatically from Working time fl exibility opportunities and some schemes introduced by the '35 hours law' at the end of the 1990s -such as annualization of working time and time-saving accounts -were also intensively used in many fi rms (see also Section 6.1, case study 1). Paradoxically, while reductions in working time were implemented in many fi rms, the average France, 2007 France, -2009 seems that many fi rms preferred to cut employment while maintaining overtime for their core workforce -that is, favouring external fl exibility over internal fl exibility, and therefore increasing inequalities between those who kept their jobs and those who lost them.
Inequalities also in the conditions of dismissal
Beyond temp agency work, analysis of the entry fl ows in the jobseekers list of the Public Employment Service shows that the great majority of new jobseekers were the least protected in terms of employment status, as well as in terms of conditions of dismissal (see Table 5 .2).
Resulting from the specifi cities of the French EPL, the most protective form of dismissal for the workers is 'dismissal for economic reasons', even more so in the case of collective dismissals. 7 Workers dismissed for economic reasons can benefi t from three schemes. The fi rst, the 'congé de reclassement' (outplacement scheme), is mandatory for fi rms with more than 1,000 employees. The duration is between four and nine months, during which the worker can benefi t from specifi c follow-up and training measures. He or she keeps all his or her social security rights (in terms of pensions and so on), and receives from his or her fi rm 65 per cent of his or her former gross hourly compensation (85 per cent in the case of a minimum wage earner). Firms with fewer than 1,000 employees have to implement the CRP scheme ('convention de reclassement personnalisée') or the CTP scheme ('contrat de transition professionnelle') -the CTP being experimented with in only a few regions. Those schemes provide the jobseeker with a higher replacement rate than the standard unemployment benefi t and with a reinforced follow-up and job search assistance provided by the Public Employment Service.
8 But to benefi t from a CRP, an employee must have tenure of at least two years and a long enough employment record to be entitled to unemployment benefi t. Recently hired workers (including many young people) are therefore excluded. Middleaged skilled male workers make up a large proportion of the benefi ciaries. Even though their number increased notably during the crisis, monthly entry fl ows for dismissals for economic reasons made up only 4.4 per cent of total entries in 2009, against about 7.5 per cent for entries due to the end of a temporary agency work contract and 24.6 per cent for those due to the end of fi xed-term contracts.
But the most striking fact is the big jump in the entries due to 'other reasons'. This includes 'termination by mutual agreement' ('rupture conventionnelle'), which is not legally considered as a quit nor a dismissal, stricto sensu. This new legal way of terminating a labour contract was introduced at the beginning of 2008, and no data are yet available on the content of agreements (in terms of eff ective severance pay, accompanying measures and so on). They numbered 128,000 in 2009 (Jeanneau op. cit.) .
Outcomes in Terms of Unemployment: Inequalities in Terms of Age, Gender and Skill
Because women are less concentrated in the manufacturing and construction sectors than men, their unemployment rate did not rise as much (see Figure 5 .5). Young people and older workers were severely hit by the crisis: between the fi rst quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2009, the number of unemployed increased by 39 per cent among 16-24 year olds and 32 per cent among 55-64 year olds, as compared to 'only' 24 per cent among 25-49 year olds. But from then on, whereas youth unemployment stabilized and even decreased slightly, the number of unemployed aged 50 years and over continued to increase sharply, as did the number of middleaged unemployed (see Table 5 .3).
This indicates that, in fact, the negative impact on adult and senior workers may have been only delayed, with young people, often on temporary contracts, serving as a buff er. The signifi cant increase in the declared unemployment of older workers results not only from dismissals but also from an increase in their participation rate. Two reforms adopted before the crisis have played a role here. First, the pension reform of 2003 acted as an incentive to postpone retirement. Second, unemployed workers of 57 years of age or over could receive, under some conditions, their unemployment benefi t without being required to search actively for a job under the DRE (Dispense de Recherché d'Emploi) scheme. As a result, they were not considered as offi cially unemployed (that is, according to ILO criteria), but instead, as being out of the labour force. But the DRE scheme was reformed in 2008 and the minimum entry age was progressively increased (to 58 in 2008 and 59 in 2009), as a result of which the number of new entrants in the scheme fell from 155,000 in 2007 to only 77,000 in 2009. As a consequence, many workers who would have entered the DRE scheme before the reform were now on unemployment benefi t (and considered as unemployed according to ILO criteria).
The most dramatic eff ects are perhaps yet to come, especially for lowskilled workers of age 50 or over, with long tenure in their previous job, who are particularly hard to place once unemployed. But long-term eff ects may also impact young workers -more particularly, the 2008 and 2009 cohorts of school leavers. According to the CEREQ (2008) such a 'scarring' eff ect on a cohort of school leavers was observed after the 2003 recession.
Long-term unemployment -and the resulting potential 'hysteresis' eff ect -may be a signifi cant problem in the coming months, and even years. The share of unemployed who have been seeking a job for one year or more decreased notably during the fi rst months of the crisis, due to the great number of new entrants resulting from cuts in employment. But it started to rise rapidly from the fi rst quarter of 2009 -jumping from 32.2 per cent in 2009 Q1 to 37.9 per cent in 2009 Q4.
A Substantial Impact on Job Quality?
If the rise in unemployment is the most obvious symptom of the crisis, the consequences for the workers that remain employed (or fi nd a new job) should also be taken into account. Indeed, one should expect some deterioration in average job quality. Beyond pay, on which we will focus in 6.1
9.3
Note: * 2nd quarter.
Source: INSEE.
Jérôme Gautié -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:22:04PM via free access the next section, 'job quality' covers all the employment terms and working conditions attached to a job: job security (contractual basis of the employment relationship), social entitlements (such as health insurance, pension, paid vacation, parental leave, paid sick days and other non-wage compensation), training and career opportunities, work schedules (imposed or desired), work pace, health and safety conditions, and many other things. Assessing the impact of the crisis on job quality is particularly complex, not only because of the numerous dimensions to be taken into account, but also because of the lack of detailed data on many of them. For many aspects, one has to rely on case studies.
One of the indicators of the deterioration in job quality may be the rise in the share of part-time jobs, notably among young women (Figure 5.6) , and, beyond that, the increase in under-employment, covering ' involuntary part-time' and partial unemployment (see Table 5 .4).
Case and fi eld studies may provide some interesting empirical evidence on the evolution of job quality. According to the Alpha (2009) report, 10 in the manufacturing sector, the crisis has induced reallocation of jobs from large fi rms to smaller ones, with lower job quality (in terms of pay, working time and other working conditions). Some displaced workers have also had to take a job in the personal service activity (caring and so on), which is also characterized by lower job quality. In some sectors, such as big retailers, if the negative impact on employment was fairly limited, the crisis has accelerated the introduction of new work organizations intending to cut costs, with an impact in terms of work intensifi cation. Another consequence of the crisis is an increase in the violations of labour law, especially for temporary work. This may be an important element, especially in the French context. Indeed, in a comparative perspective, the French labour market may appear highly regulated, but because unions are often weak or absent at the workplace level, and because the number of labour inspectors is relatively low, law violations are numerous, especially in sectors intensive in low-skilled/low-paid work (Caroli and Gautié, 2008; Gautié and Schmitt, 2010 ).
IMPACT ON WAGES AND INCOME
INEQUALITIES: SO FAR RATHER LIMITED, THE WORST MAY BE TO COME
Wage Inequalities: Limited Impact of the Crisis
Basic wages little aff ected by the crisis
To assess the impact of the crisis on worker's earnings, one must diff erentiate between the basic wage, on the one hand, and bonuses and premiums on the other. The average monthly basic wage (MBW) was apparently little aff ected by the crisis. Its growth did decelerate -from an annual rate of about 3.1 per cent between June 2005 and June 2008, to 2.2 per cent between June 2008 and June 2009 -but as infl ation also decelerated, and at a faster pace, on average the purchasing power of basic wages increased. Moreover, the inequalities between occupational skill levels tended to be stable (or even to decrease slightly) during the period (see Table 5 .5).
The limited impact of the crisis on the basic wage is confi rmed by a survey 11 on wage policies during the fi rst year of the crisis (Horny et al., 2010 -see Table 5 .6). Cuts in basic wages were implemented in only 1 per cent of fi rms. One must remember that, according to French labour law, a basic wage cut requires a written modifi cation of the labour contract, which must be offi cially approved by the worker. Moreover, more than 90 per cent of workers in the private sector are covered by a collective agreement because of the legal extension mechanism.
12 Those agreements usually fi x a minimum wage level for every skill level. Nevertheless, restrictions due to legislation do not seem to be the main reason for not decreasing the basic wage. More than 80 per cent of fi rms declared that such a wage cut would have had a negative impact on motivation and eff ort, and more than 60 per cent feared they would have lost their best workers; results which are in line with basic models of effi ciency wage theory. Nevertheless, those considerations did not prevent about 30 per cent of fi rms cutting components of compensation other than the basic wage (see Table 5 .6).
Bonus cuts but potentially aff ecting more skilled employees
Indeed, bonuses and premiums are more sensitive to the economic downturn, especially performance-based individual and collective bonuses, as well as earnings from profi t-sharing (see below).
The share of premiums and bonuses (other than profi t-sharing) in compensation increases with the compensation level (and is higher for full-time than for part-time workers) (Table 5 .7), so their decline in the crisis should have aff ected more high wage workers. This is confi rmed by a more detailed analysis of premiums and bonuses (Table 5 .8). The seniority premium -which cannot be cut -represents a higher share at lower wage levels, whereas it is the reverse for individual and collective performance-based pay, which is more sensitive to the economic situation of the fi rm. Note that other kinds of bonuses were aff ected by the crisis, such as night work premiums (included in 'work constraints bonuses and premiums'), which aff ect more blue-collar workers. With a decrease in activity, many fi rms in the manufacturing sector suppressed night shifts, and many young low-paid blue-collars, in particular those who had accepted night work to increase their earnings, were aff ected (Alpha 2009). 
Profi t-sharing schemes as a fl exibility tool in the crisis
Profi t-sharing schemes are widespread in France, in comparison to other European countries. According to a European survey, 35 per cent of French establishments implement a profi t-sharing scheme (called 'intéressement'), the highest level in the EU27.
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The share of earnings from profi t-sharing schemes in the total compensation of the employees that benefi t from such schemes is on average (slightly) higher for low-paid workers -that is, those in the fi rst quartile of the wage distribution (Table 5 .9) -but only 29 per cent of them were aff ected, in comparison to about 40 per cent of the employees in the second and third quartiles of distribution, and up to 57 per cent in the highest quartile.
In some sectors, such as the automotive industry, which has been hard hit by the crisis, bonuses, premiums and gain-sharing represent a share of total compensation much higher than the average indicated in Tables 5.8 and 5.9. Cuts in those components of compensation were important in many fi rms in these sectors (see Section 6.1, case study 1 for some evidence on the automotive industry). But the share of low-wage work is fairly low in these sectors (in 2006, for instance, only about 4 per cent of the workers in the automotive industry earned the SMIC as their basic wage, as compared to 11.3 per cent in the manufacturing sector as a whole, and 14.6 per cent in the private sector as a whole).
Overall, cuts in bonuses and premiums and gain-sharing earnings may have aff ected more middle-and high-paid workers than low-wage workers. But at the time this chapter was written, no detailed data for 2008 and 2009 were available concerning the eff ective impact of the crisis on bonuses and premiums. 
Working time reductions: inequalities in terms of compensation
We may assume that the employees who suff ered the biggest drop in earnings were those who experienced 'partial unemployment'. The reform of the partial employment scheme adopted during the crisis signifi cantly increased the compensation of hours not worked (see Section 6.1). In some branches and/or fi rms, collective agreements have introduced more generous compensation or specifi c advantages, as in the chemical industry and the automotive industry, for instance (see Section 6.1). Overall, there may be signifi cant inequalities concerning the situation of workers in partial unemployment, depending on industry and fi rm. While large fi rms in the manufacturing sector, especially in sectors where the average wage is relatively high, were often able to limit the reduction in compensation, many other fi rms were not able to do so.
Impact on Income Inequalities and Poverty
Buff er role of the income maintenance scheme: crucial, but unequal
As the French social protection system is one of the most developed in the world, income maintenance schemes have played a crucial role. Nevertheless, some vulnerable groups are less protected than others, so the crisis has increased some inequalities. Even if unemployment insurance benefi t became more generous in terms of access, after the February 2009 reform (see Section 5.2), the coverage is still rather low: at the end of 2009, less than 75 per cent of the jobseekers registered at the Public Employment Service in Category A (covering those who have not worked a single hour during the month) were receiving the benefi t. There is also an income support form of unemployment benefi t (that is, a means-tested allowance), for those who have an insuffi cient employment record to be covered by the unemployment insurance system, or who have exhausted their insurance allowance. But one must have worked at least fi ve years during the past ten years to be entitled. As a consequence, many unemployed persons are excluded -and in particular young people -and the coverage rate is only about 10 per cent of all jobseekers. Overall, about 40 per cent of job seekers do not receive benefi t. In 2010, more than one million unemployed were expected to fully exhaust their unemployment insurance benefi t by the end of the year, of whom 360,000 were not entitled to unemployment assistance or minimum income benefi t.
The minimum income benefi t, the RSA (Revenu de Solidarité Active), replacing the former RMI (Revenu Minimum d'Insertion), which is also a means-tested allowance and was reformed at the beginning of 2009, functions as a safety net (460 euros a month for a single person). But one must be 25 years of age or above to be entitled: once again, young people are excluded. At the end of 2009, a reform was introduced to facilitate the access of young people (see Section 5.2), but its expected impact is limited.
Overall, because of the gaps in the social safety net, young people and workers with sparse employment records are the most vulnerable groups. The measures targeted on them adopted in 2009-2010 (see Section 5.1) have not been suffi cient to countervail the increase in poverty.
Poverty: is the worst yet to come?
Beyond the expected evolution of wage inequalities, the impact of the crisis on income inequalities and poverty was not easy to assess at the time this chapter was written (end 2010 This timing is the result of a well-known phenomenon: the delay between the increase in unemployment and the increase in poverty. The delay may be even longer in the current crisis, due to the emergency measures that were targeted at low-income workers and households (and also measures decided before the crisis -see next section). Correlated with the expected decline -or at least stagnation -of median income following the economic downturn, these measures may even induce a decrease in the poverty rate (measured at 60 per cent of the median income threshold) in the short run, which would be a truly paradoxical outcome of the crisis (Observatoire de la Pauvreté 2010). But other forecasts are much more pessimistic: according to the OFCE (2009), the elasticity of the number of poor to the number of unemployed should be about 45 per cent between 2007 and 2010 -each increase of 100 unemployed leading to an increase of 45 in the number of poor.
When objective indicators are lacking, one may turn to subjective ones. One of the most striking results of the Flash EuroBarometer (2010) on perceptions of the crisis is that the French were among the most worried and pessimistic about the evolution of poverty -especially in relation to comparable countries in terms of GDP per capita. In the survey conducted in May 2010, 35 per cent of French respondents declared that they had the feeling that poverty 'had strongly increased' during the past 12 months in the area where they live -close to Italians (37 per cent), but higher than in Spain, Latvia and Lithuania, for instance, where the crisis was much deeper, and well above Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark and Sweden (Table 5 .10).
TACKLING THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE CRISIS: THE ROLE OF PUBLIC POLICY AND SOCIAL DIALOGUE
The Main Measures Adopted
The main measures adopted to cope with the economic and social consequences of the crisis are summarized in Table 5 .11 (see also Erhel, 2009; Freyssinet, 2010; Zemmour, 2010) . A fi rst set of policy measures was introduced at the end of 2008. This initial recovery plan was based mainly on fi nancial aid given to fi rms and public investment. There were few measures to sustain household consumption, and the modest 200-euro one-shot allowance targeted at social assistance recipients was conceived rather as an emergency measure to alleviate poverty. Overall, the recovery plan was fairly limited. This was the outcome of a number of factors.
First, the public defi cit was already high in 2007 (almost 3 per cent of GDP), so the government's room to manoeuvre had already been reduced when the crisis arrived. Second, concerning social policies, important measures had been taken or agreed just before the crisis and were expected to have a signifi cant positive impact on low-income households. They included the reform of the minimum income benefi t, with the introduction of the RSA (see above), which is also an in-work benefi t, and therefore should contribute to lowering working poverty. A major increase in a number of other means-tested allowances had also been decided. Eventually, following a small peak in infl ation in 2008 (2.8 per cent), it had been decided to increase (in 2009) two of the main social allowances -family allowances and housing allowance -by 3 per cent. It should be noted that their share in the disposable income of households in the fi rst quintile of the distribution of the standard of living amounts to 26 per cent. As infl ation strongly decelerated in 2009, the planned increase had a signifi cant positive impact on the purchasing power of low-income families.
On the social partners' side, the main outlines of reform of the unemployment insurance system had been decided in January 2008 (before the crisis). The reform was adopted in February 2009 (following a national collective agreement in December 2008), modifying the rules on unemployment benefi t in order to better cover the unemployed with poor employment records. The employment record required to be entitled to the unemployment insurance benefi t -that is, funded by the Unemployment Insurance System (called UNEDIC, see below) -was decreased, and the maximum duration of benefi t was extended.
14 Due to the political pressure exerted by left-wing parties and the unions (with major demonstrations in the fi rst quarter of 2009 -see below), and growing public anxiety, the Government was forced to adopt new measures from the start of 2009 (tripartite 'social summit' in February, tripartite agreement in April), including: a special allowance for some unemployed persons not receiving unemployment benefi t; an increase in those involved in active labour market schemes; reform of the 'partial unemployment' scheme to improve coverage and income replacement; and specifi c measures targeted at young people. Measures to sustain household consumption were also applied, such as a cut in income tax and the distribution of vouchers to buy household services.
From the end of 2009, social emergency measures were also introduced, for young people (in September) and for the long-term unemployed whose unemployment benefi t entitlement had expired (tripartite agreement of April 2010).
Overall, the public defi cit rose sharply, to about 8 
Expected Impact on Various Groups in Society
To understand the measures adopted by the state and the social partners, and how they did or did not take into account the interests of various social groups, one must take into account, as pointed out by Freyssinet (2010) , the complex interplay between the relevant players. Oversimplifying somewhat, because of the mixed BismarkianBeveridgian tradition, it may appear that, in France, the social partners usually take care of 'insiders' through the social insurance system, while the state takes care of 'outsiders' by implementing several income maintenance schemes based on the social assistance (in other words, means-tested) principle. The best illustration of this is probably the unemployment benefi t system. Since the early 1980s, it has relied on two separate systems: the unemployment insurance system, funded by workers' social contributions and governed by the social partners (through an institution called UNEDIC), and unemployment assistance benefi t, a means-tested allowance funded by the state (in other words, the tax-payer). However, this example also illustrates that, in fact, it is not easy to separate the responsibilities and prerogatives of the state and the social partners. At the end of 2009 and the beginning of 2010, there was growing concern about the 360,000 unemployed who were to lose their unemployment insurance benefi t. The fi rst reaction of the main employers' organization, MEDEF, which plays a central role in UNEDIC, was to declare that only the Government should intervene, whereas the Minister of Employment 15 stated that 'unemployment benefi t is above all a matter for the social partners' (quoted by Freyssinet 2010: 10). Eventually a solution was found (see above, and Table 5 .11), due to the pressure exerted by both the social partners and public opinion.
The complex strategic interactions between the state and the social partners rely on many channels. Unions may infl uence government policy by staging major demonstrations: this was the case at the beginning of 2009 (between one and two million people demonstrated on 29 January), when the Government was forced to propose a tripartite 'social summit' and to announce the new measures already mentioned. As pointed out by Zemmour (2010) , this summit was considered a turning point in government policy (even if the unions were far from satisfi ed). Indeed, policy measures adopted during the fi rst half of 2009 were targeted more at middle-income, better protected (also in terms of entitlements to unemployment benefi ts) workers and/or households. Middle-aged, semi-skilled or skilled male workers, with long employment records, often working in manufacturing sectors where wages are relatively high, were indeed prominent among the benefi ciaries of the 'partial unemployment' scheme or of the special 'CRP' scheme for displaced workers (see Section 3.1), which were reformed to improve coverage of workers. Middle-income households also benefi ted more from the fi scal measures adopted (see Table 5 .11).
But does this mean that, overall, unions promoted the interests of 'insiders' and rather neglected 'outsiders' (in other words, the most vul-nerable groups)? Following Freyssinet (2010), we might consider this criticism unfair. First, as detailed in Table 5 .11, many measures adopted by the social partners, either alone (national collective agreements) or with the state (tripartite agreements), were intended to improve the situation of the most vulnerable groups, through unemployment benefi ts or active labour market schemes. The unions also urged the Government to intervene more in favour of temporary workers when they lose their job. However, fi nancial constraints mean that policy towards these workers has remained modest (see Section 6.2, case study 2).
Second, the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' must be approached very cautiously. Workers in large fi rms in the automotive industry benefi ting from partial unemployment (see Section 6.1, case study 1), may appear privileged in some respects, but they may also be considered 'vulnerable' workers, since, for many of them, the chances of fi nding a new job if dismissed are not high. The focus of the unions on such supposed 'insiders' may therefore be considered as a strategy for the development of preventive measures rather than merely curative ones for those who are already 'excluded'.
Overall, even if they have benefi ted from specifi c measures, the longterm unemployed and low-skilled unemployed young people again turned out to be the most vulnerable groups. The extension of the minimum income benefi t (RSA) to young people, so far excluded from it, was symbolic. But the conditions are so restrictive (working two years out of the past three) that this extension can be expected to benefi t very few unemployed young people.
CASE STUDIES: CONFIRMING THE DUAL SYSTEM
As already mentioned in Section 3, a stark contrast has been discernible during the crisis between, on the one hand, the protective measures implemented in many sectors and fi rms in favour of the core workforce -the so-called 'insiders' -and, on the other hand, the fairly brutal buff er role played by temporary workers. The following case studies focus on this contrast. As seen in the previous sections (for example, Section 3.1) there has been intensive use of the short-time compensation scheme called 'partial unemployment' in France during the crisis, encouraged by the Government and the social partners. It is a good example of internal fl exibility used to protect the core workforce, and we will illustrate this by analysing the reaction to the crisis of the two main fi rms in the French automotive sector, Renault and Peugeot (Peugeot Société Anonyme -PSA). This sector was chosen because it was among those hardest hit by the crisis. Conversely, the second case study analyses what happened to 'outsiders' -temporary agency workers. As already mentioned, they suffered considerably in terms of job losses during the crisis. We will analyse what measures -if any -were implemented to help them during this period. 16 (chômage partiel) was introduced in 1968 by a national collective agreement. Partial unemployment is intended to help fi rms coping with a temporary fall in activity due to a short-term economic downturn or exceptional circumstances -including disaster (fi re and so on), signifi cant building work and restructuring, or supply diffi culties.
Internal Flexibility to Limit
The scheme was modifi ed several times between the end of 2008 and the end of 2010, and a new scheme was introduced in April 2009, 'Reduced Activity of Long Duration' (Activité Réduite de Longue Durée -ARLD).
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The various features of the schemes are presented in Table 5 .12.
All the parameters of the partial unemployment scheme were modifi ed in order to facilitate its use: the eligibility criteria concerning the restriction on part-time work were suppressed, and the maximum duration and the maximum number of annual hours authorized were increased, as were the replacement rate of the allowance received by the employee and the amount of public subsidy.
One important concern was training, which was prohibited during the partial unemployment period. The restriction was abolished, however, and in the new ARLD scheme, training is strongly encouraged. Beyond the replacement rate, which is more generous than that of the partial unemployment scheme, ARLD innovates in the nature of the funding of the subsidy for fi rms: UNEDIC, which is governed by the social partners and funded by social contributions, participated, taking over the additional subsidy (of 3.90 euros, on top of the 3.33/3.84 euros provided by the state) from the fi ftieth hour of inactivity.
The role of social dialogue has been crucial in these reforms, and it has long been one of the most consensual issues. The social partners fi rst agreed (by a national collective agreement in December 2008) to increase the replacement rate of the allowance paid by the employer, and then asked the state to increase its subsidy, and also to increase the maximum duration and hours authorized, which it did immediately. As for the introduction of ARLD, it was a government initiative, and a tripartite national agreement was reached in April 2009, defi ning the contribution of UNEDIC.
But social dialogue also played an important role at the industry and fi rm levels -as illustrated below -where the detailed implementation modalities had to be determined.
In a way, all these changes -and in particular the introduction of the ARLD -benefi t workers, who gain from higher compensation while on 'partial unemployment'. But at the same time, they favoured potential inequalities as the use of the most 'generous' scheme (the ARLD) -because it is more costly for the employer, despite the higher public subsidy -is in fact restricted to large fi rms in (relatively) high wage sectors. Another source of potential inequalities is that these schemes are just a regulatory framework, and their precise modalities of implementation have to be fi xed at industry and fi rm level and therefore depend on the bargaining power of the workers aff ected.
Internal fl exibility tools available in France
Since the mid-1990s, partial unemployment in France has been strongly aff ected by the introduction of the working time reduction (WTR) scheme (Calavrezo et al. 2007 ).
18 WTR not only involves reducing legal weekly working time from 39 hours to 35 hours, but has also introduced signifi cant working time fl exibility. Firms are now legally required to use this tool rather than partial unemployment. Most fi rms have adopted the 'annualization' of working time, 19 as well as, in many cases, individual and collective 'time-saving accounts'.
The working time reduction scheme has tended to replace partial unemployment as a fl exibility tool since the end of the 1990s. The number of days of partial unemployment authorized by the administration 20 has strongly decreased, being cut almost by six between 1996 and 2005 (Calavrezo et al. 2007) .
During the 2008-2009 crisis, the increase in the use of partial unemployment was much higher among large fi rms, as well as in the manufacturing sector (Tables 5.13 and 5.14) . 21 More than 91 per cent of the authorized hours were concentrated in this sector at the end of 2008 -as against 65 per cent in January of the same year -and the fi gure was still 85 per cent at the end of 2009. Conversely, employees in the tertiary sector, and especially in small fi rms, were much less aff ected, also simply because their sector was not hit by the crisis to the same extent. Note that the decline of partial unemployment from mid-2009 is partly due to the introduction of ARLD. -the employer must off er each employee on ARLD a skills evaluation and/or a training programme -the employee cannot be dismissed during a period double the length of the agreement** Notes: * That is, if the employee does not work at all (if the establishment is closed, for example); ** For instance, if the agreement between the fi rm and the Ministry of Labour has been signed for a six-month period, the employee cannot be dismissed during the subsequent 12 months. PU = Partial Unemployment; ARLD = Reduced Activity of Long Duration.
Jérôme Gautié -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:22:04PM via free access 6.1.3 Initial adaptations in the automotive sector: Peugeot-Citroën and Renault As the automotive industry was one among the most severely hit by the crisis (sales plunged in Europe by 25 per cent between mid-2008 and mid-2009), it may be interesting to take it as an illustration. In particular, we will focus on the large fi rms Peugeot-Citroën (PSA) and Renault, to analyse how the short-time compensation schemes were implemented and how they complemented other fl exibility tools.
When the crisis hit from mid-2008, the fi rst reaction of all the fi rms in the sector was to cut the number of temporary agency workers and workers on fi xed-term contracts. About 4,000 temporary workers were employed by PSA before the crisis, and about 3,000 by Renault. These numbers were reduced almost to nil at the beginning of 2009, with no accompanying measures for temps. As for permanent workers, working time fl exibility tools were used. First, there has been some wage fl exibility. The share of bonuses and premiums in the automotive industry, which amounted to 13.3 per cent of average compensation (profi t-sharing not included) in 2006, is slightly higher than average (12.4 per cent -see Table 5 .7, Section 4.1). Both the share of the seniority premium (28 per cent of all bonuses and premiums, as compared to 16 per cent in all sectors) and the work constraints premiums (32 per cent in comparison to 12 per cent) are particularly high. Premiums for shift work and night work may represent up to 25 per cent of total compensation (gain-sharing not taken into account) for some workers. At Renault, for instance, the hourly rate for shift work is about 40 per cent higher than the normal hourly rate for the lowest paid workers. As in the other fi rms, the hourly overpay for night work usually amounts to 20-25 per cent of the basic (hourly) wage. But the number of shifts (especially night shifts) has decreased considerably due to the crisis. Blue-collar workers were therefore particularly hard hit, in contrast with white-collar workers who are not aff ected by these premiums.
Profi t-sharing also plays an important role. There are two profi t-sharing schemes at Renault, for instance: one at the enterprise level, the other at the plant level. The gain is proportionate to the basic wage. In 2007, profi tsharing for the lowest-paid workers amounted to between 3,220 euros and 3,700 euros (2,500 euros coming from the central level, 720 euros to 1,200 euros depending on the plant) -that is, the equivalent of 2 to 2.5 monthly basic gross wages (which amounted to 1,390 euros for the great majority of the lowest-paid workers). In 2008-2009, profi t-sharing at the enterprise level was reduced to zero, and it was strongly reduced at plant level. There is some inequality between workers according to the plant they belong to, as the adjustment depended on the plant.
Internal fl exibility tools were also used. Both Renault and PSA had introduced, at the end of 1999, when the 35-hour working week was implemented, individual and collective time-saving accounts for employees. Collective time-saving accounts are used as fl exibility tools; 22 whereas employees are free to use the time accumulated in their individual time account as they want.
At PSA, each hour of overtime (that is, above 35 hours) goes towards the collective account, up to 35 hours. After that, every additional hour of overtime goes towards the individual account. When the workload is low, the fi rm can ask workers to stay at home, deducting the corresponding hours from their collective time account. The balance of the collective account can even be negative, with a maximum 35-hour defi cit. 23 In case of a defi cit, employees must compensate by working more hours in the future, when the fi rm asks them to do so, but not proportionally: for example, if they have a 35-hour defi cit -that is, corresponding to fi ve days' work -they will have to work only 21 hours (that is, three more days), within a two-year period, to compensate. At Renault, the time-saving account system is diff erent: working time is annualized, and the reduction in working time to 35 hours a week was implemented by increasing the number of days off (ten more days holiday during the year) instead of reducing weekly working time. Seven out of these ten additional days off go towards the collective time-saving account, and the other three towards the individual account. But the use of collective time accounts is decentralized: each establishment has its own 'local agreement on fl exibility'. For instance, in some establishments, workers can work even on Saturdays, and up to 48 hours a week during certain periods. In this case, the hours worked during the weekend and/or over 37 hours a week go towards the collective time-saving account, which also serves as a fl exibility tool for the establishment, as at PSA.
The reliance on partial unemployment
But these tools turned out rapidly to be insuffi cient to cope with the plunge in activity, and both enterprises had to use the partial unemployment scheme from the end of 2008, and the new ARLD scheme from mid-2009. At PSA, in December 2008, for instance, some workers were asked to stay at home for the entire month, de facto exceeding the fi xed maximum defi cit authorized for their collective time-saving accounts (−35 hours). At the end of the fi rst semester of 2009, the global defi cit of all collective saving accounts amounted to three million hours. The fi rm therefore resorted to the partial unemployment scheme. During the fi rst semester of 2009, the total amount of hours of partial unemployment amounted to the equivalent of 3,000 full-time jobs. Instead of an allowance amounting to 60 per cent of the gross wage -that is, about 75 per cent of net wage (which was now the legal requirement) -PSA maintained the full wage, but with a corollary: employees had to compensate for it in the future by working 12 more days for each period of 25 days on partial unemployment. Partial unemployment and collective saving accounts (with no more limits on the defi cit) were used as complementary tools. From April 2009, as made possible by the new regulation, the fi rm asked for a quid pro quo: training during the partial unemployment period. About 700 workers were trained in 'lean production' methods between April and July 2009. Then, in early September 2009, the new ARLD was introduced, following a collective agreement signed by all the unions (six of them are represented at the central level). Executives and managers were not aff ected -in other words, they were exempted from any form of partial unemployment. The short-time allowance amounted to 75 per cent of gross compensation or about 90 per cent of the net wage (but work constraints premiums, such as premiums for shift work and night work, were not included). If an employee on ARLD wanted to maintain 100 per cent of their net wage, they could increase their defi cit hours on their collective account (under certain conditions), or use the surplus hours on their individual account. Those who agreed to be trained while on ARLD benefi ted from a 100 per cent replacement rate.
The story was similar at Renault, although with some important differences. Executives and managers (les 'cadres') were also aff ected by the short-time compensation scheme, but with a 100 per cent replacement rate. As a quid pro quo, for every fi ve days on partial unemployment or ARLD, one day was taken from their individual time-saving account and went into a specifi c fund, the 'crisis solidarity fund', which was introduced when the fi rst 'crisis social collective agreement' (accord social de crise) was signed in March 2009. This fund was used to increase the allowance of other workers (blue-collars and clerks) on partial unemployment or ARLD. There was therefore some solidarity between higher-and lowerpaid workers. Moreover, for blue-collars and clerks, unlike at PSA, the allowance was based on total compensation (with replacement rates of 60 per cent in the case of partial unemployment and 75 per cent in the case of ARLD); that is, including premiums. Employees could also complement their allowance up to 100 per cent of their net wage by using their individual time-saving account -using one day for every 10 days on partial unemployment. As at PSA, social dialogue played a crucial role at Renault: the agreement introducing the ARLD (December 2009) was signed by all the unions (fi ve at the central level).
Concluding remarks
In many ways, the permanent workers at Renault and PSA appear to be privileged. First, they were partially protected by a 'peripheral workforce' of temporary agency workers -used intensively in this sector -who lost their jobs without any accompanying measures. Second, they benefi ted from fairly generous short-time compensation schemes with high public subsidies. Nevertheless, there were some inequalities among the workers at the two fi rms. Concerning compensation, blue-collars were hit harder overall, as many of them lost a number of premiums, such as the night shift bonus, and they were more aff ected by 'partial unemployment'. At PSA, executives and managers were exempted. At Renault, the inequality between blue-and (high wage) white-collars was reduced by the introduction of a 'solidarity fund'. This shows that the way in which a general scheme (such as the ARLD) is implemented at fi rm level -and therefore, social dialogue -impacts on potential inequalities.
Caring for Outsiders: Were There any Specifi c Measures for
Temporary Agency Workers?
6.2.1 The youngest and least skilled are the most vulnerable among temporary workers As seen in Section 3.1, temporary work was severely hit by the crisis; and temporary workers were revealed to be the most vulnerable groups during the fi rst year of the crisis. It is striking that inequalities are also strong among temporary workers, as some groups (the youngest and the lowest skilled) are more vulnerable than others.
The decline was the sharpest among blue-collar workers, and in particular unskilled blue-collar workers (see Table 5 .15). The number of temps (in full-time equivalents) aged below 25 decreased by 31 per cent in 2009, in comparison to 24 per cent for those aged between 25 and 49 years old, and 21 per cent for those aged 50 and over. Note that the distribution of hours worked throughout the year is very uneven as, in 2009, 50 per cent of temps did only 10 per cent of total hours of temporary work. The crisis does not seem to have aff ected this dimension of inequality, as the distribution was almost exactly the same in 2007 -that is, before the crisis (Domens 2010).
Some initiatives at industry level, but of limited impact
While the government was fairly active in the protection of permanent workers through short-time compensation schemes (see Section 6.1), in sharp contrast, almost no policy measures were targeted at temporary workers. At the end of 2008, the unions asked the Government to extend the CRP follow-up measure (restricted to permanent workers laid off for 'economic reasons' -see Section 3.1), 24 but their request was rejected because the cost was considered too high. As a consequence, only a few measures were taken at the industry level, besides some local initiatives, but with limited impact.
It must be remembered that the regulation of temporary agency work in France is among the strictest in Europe. Firms are not allowed to use temporary agency work as a substitute for permanent work. The maximum duration is 18 months, and a 'precarity premium' amounting to 10 per cent of the basic wage must be paid to temporary workers. Moreover, social dialogue is alive and well rooted in the temporary work agencies sector, and many collective agreements have been signed in the past decade, in particular on vocational training. A specifi c mutual fund for training exists at the industry level, the 'FAF-TT' (Fonds d'Assurance Formation du Travail Temporaire), which collects a mandatory contribution amounting to 2 per cent of the total wage bill of temporary work agencies. At least 50 per cent of these funds must be dedicated to the training of temporary workers (that is, not the permanent workers employed by temporary work agencies). In local areas, several temporary work agencies can decide to work together to outline a training programme to meet the needs of the local labour market, and seek funding from the FAF-TT. These ' collective' training programmes are called 'OPALs'.
As the funding of the FAF-TT is based on temporary work agencies' payroll -in other words, permanent employees in the agencies and temporary workers contracting with the agencies -it was severely aff ected by the crisis, experiencing a 30 per cent fall between 2008 and 2009. The Ministry of Employment therefore decided to react, not only on a shortterm basis (by increasing the number of training schemes for unemployed temporary agency workers), but also in the medium term, aiming also to train temporary workers for allocation to, supposedly, the most promising sectors in terms of job creation after the crisis. An agreement to this end was signed between the Ministry of Employment and the temporary work industry. The FAF-TT received a special public subsidy for a two-year period (2009) (2010) . This subsidy was allocated mainly to training schemes targeted at the most vulnerable groups: low-skilled workers, young people below 26 years of age without experience, jobseekers of 45 or over and social assistance recipients. Note that for the latter (young people, older jobseekers and social assistance recipients), no condition was imposed in terms of work experience as a temporary agency worker before they could benefi t from a training scheme. The agreement was signed in May 2009. One year later (April 2010), the total number of benefi ciaries throughout the period amounted to fewer than 2,000 persons, which is very low, refl ecting the very low public subsidy allocated to this programme (6.7 million euros for the two years). 25 Overall, even if there was some attempt to implement specifi c schemes for temporary agency workers, the public investment in those schemes was so low that their impact was very limited.
Local responses:
The 'Pôle Position' scheme in Northern France At the local level, a number of initiatives emerged to provide temporary workers with follow-up services. The most important during 2009-2010 was the 'Pôle Position' scheme, which was introduced in northern France. This region is highly specialized in the automotive industry: automotive constructors and their subcontractors employed about 55,000 workers at the beginning of 2008, and almost 25 per cent were temporary agency workers. Almost half of them (about 5,000) lost their jobs between September 2008 and March 2009. Note that temporary workers in the automotive industry constitute a specifi c population: they usually have long-term contracts (up to a year, or even more in some cases); 26 and their hourly wage is relatively high.
This region was one of the few in France in which the CTP (Contrat de Transition Professionnel) 27 was experimented with. The local branch of the public agency for adult vocational training, the AFPA (Association pour la Formation Professionnelle des Adultes), which was in charge of the CTP, decided to introduce a similar scheme for unemployed temporary workers who, like all other temporary workers, were not entitled to the CTP or any other follow-up scheme. The fi rst step was to establish a partnership with other institutions, such as the local branch of the Public Employment Service and the institution in charge of the training of temps at the industry level (FAF-TT -see above), but also fi ve local temporary work agencies. The funding -with an initial budget of 3 million euros or so -was provided mainly by the regional authorities, as well as the European Social Fund, which provided almost 1.3 out of the 3 million euros.
In April 2009, the 'Pôle Position' scheme was introduced. It was restricted to low-skilled temps (that is, with a high school diploma or less) who had worked at least four months out of the past 18 in the automotive industry (including all subcontractors). The scheme was implemented in four municipalities in the region, in specifi c local agencies with dedicated counsellors from one of the participating partners (AFPA, Public Employment Service and temporary work agencies). The scheme consisted of a one-year follow-up, with interviews once a week with the referring counsellor, and provided benefi ciaries with diff erent kinds of services: collective thematic workshops, skill assessment, in-depth personal competency assessment, active job search assistance, assistance in outlining a professional project, and so on. However, the main purpose of the scheme was to provide temps with a vocational training diploma and/or a permanent job in other activities than automotive manufacturing -such as construction, logistics and transportation (bus or truck drivers) -in which there were some job vacancies in the local labour market.
From April 2009 to August 2010, up to 3,700 unemployed temporary workers received a proposal to join, and about 35 per cent did so. One of the reasons for this relatively low take-up rate is that the 'Pôle Position' scheme did not provide a specifi c allowance. As a consequence, among the temps who were not entitled to unemployment benefi t, many preferred to continue to search for temporary jobs, or to benefi t from other labour market policy schemes which could provide them with some income replacement. In other words, the most 'precarious' temps were those who could not aff ord to benefi t from the 'Pôle Position' scheme. Nevertheless, the average age of benefi ciaries was 29, and more than 50 per cent were below 25 years of age.
Even at the time this chapter was written it was too early to assess the success of the scheme, 28 although the fi rst indications are fairly positive. In August 2010, among the fi rst fi ve monthly cohorts of benefi ciaries (AprilAugust 2009) -about 800 persons -more than 67 per cent had managed to get a permanent job or a vocational training diploma. From an institutional point of view, the coordination between the diff erent institutional partners functioned rather well. But, according to the organizers, the scheme would have been even more effi cient if both the social partners and the employers in the automotive industry had taken part in the experiment.
Concluding remarks
Overall, we may conclude that, both at industry and local level, the impact of the several initiatives taken for the benefi t of temporary workers was very limited -as the number of benefi ciaries remained very low. Moreover, the most vulnerable temps were less aff ected, as local initiatives were focused mainly on temporary workers in large companies (such as in the automotive industry). The 'Pôle Position' scheme was intended to target the least-skilled temporary workers, but in fact, many of them (especially young unskilled workers with a poor employment record -that is, with no entitlement to unemployment benefi t) did not take up the measure because it off ered no income replacement.
CONCLUSION
Two years after the beginning of the crisis, what conclusions can be drawn concerning its impact on inequalities in France? To summarize, this impact seems to refl ect the characteristics of the French employment regime: fairly inclusive 29 in terms of pay, but dualistic in terms of employment.
Inequalities in terms of wages -as measured by interdecile ratios -are relatively low in France in comparison to many other OECD countries. Strong wage-setting institutions -such as the legal minimum wage and collective agreements -prevented fi rms from cutting the basic wage. The variable part of compensation -in which profi t-sharing earnings play an important role in many sectors -probably played a buff er role. But as its share tends to be positively correlated with wages, overall adjustments in compensation may not have increased inequalities notably -except in some sectors where blue-collars benefi ted from night shift premiums (as night shifts were often suppressed).
As for employment, the impact of the crisis may have been much more unequal. Temporary work clearly functioned as a buff er, as more than half of job losses during the fi rst year of the crisis were due to cuts in temporary agency work. While some initiatives were launched at the industry and local levels to help temporary agency work, as presented in case study 2, they remained very limited. In sharp contrast, permanent workers were more protected, benefi ting from internal fl exibility devices, such as the short-time compensation schemes that were reformed to facilitate their use (see case study 1), as well as follow-up measures for displaced workers, more generous in terms of replacement rate and more intensive in terms of job search assistance. One may conclude that both institutions -the employment protection legislation -and public and social actors (including unions) favoured 'insiders', while neglecting 'outsiders'. But this conclusion needs some qualifi cation. As described in Section 5.1, several measures were targeted at the most vulnerable groups, and the social partners adopted some reforms of the unemployment benefi t system to better cover those with low employment records and/or with exhausted entitlements. Furthermore, the distinction between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' may be of limited relevance in a dynamic perspective. Many middleaged male workers in the manufacturing sector, benefi ting from short-time compensation schemes with high replacement rates (with almost no loss in compensation) may appear to be the best illustration of such 'insiders'. But in fact, many of them were low-or semi-skilled workers, and would have experienced great diffi culties fi nding new jobs if they had been displaced, especially in the French context, where the share of long-term unemployment is high.
The French social safety net is one of the most developed among OECD countries. There are several social assistance allowances, the main one being the minimum income benefi t (the RSA scheme), which was reformed in 2009. We may therefore expect it to play a crucial role in the prevention of intensifying poverty and social exclusion. But there are still some holes in the safety net; the fi rst victims being young people, most of whom are excluded from the RSA, despite a reform to extend its coverage.
Among the most vulnerable groups in the crisis, we fi nd the 'usual suspects': young people, the least-skilled workers and older workers. Young people may indeed appear at fi rst sight as the most vulnerable group, for several reasons: they are overrepresented among temporary workers, they have fewer entitlement rights in terms of unemployment and social assistance benefi ts and, as new entrants in the labour market, they suff er the most from the freeze in recruitment. But older workers have also been hit by the crisis, with those 50 years of age and over experiencing the highest increase in unemployment. As the retirement age was to be increased at the end of 2010, and as the access to early retirement schemes or functional equivalents has been restricted by recent reforms, there may be a strong risk of increasing poverty among this population in the coming years.
As a consequence, the worst is still to come in terms of inequality and poverty. The 2008-2009 crisis may have long-lasting eff ects in terms of earnings and employment -the so-called 'scarring' eff ect -for young new entrants in the labour market, as well as for displaced workers. 30 reasons during a 30-day period are legally required to implement a 'social plan' (plan de sauvegarde de l'emploi), which includes specifi c follow-up measures for workers. 8. Before its reform in April 2009 (see also Section 5.1), the duration of the CRP was eight months, and the benefi ciary received 80 per cent of the gross wage during the fi rst three months, 70 per cent during the following fi ve months; after the reform, the duration was extended to 12 months with an 80 per cent replacement rate during the whole period. Duration and replacement rate are the same for the CTP scheme. 9. The number of benefi ciaries of these two schemes jumped from about 30,000 at the beginning of 2008 to more than 90,000 at the end of 2009. Of these, 60 per cent were men, 72 per cent were aged between 25 and 49 (against only 6 per cent of below 25 years of age) and 56 per cent were skilled blue-collars or clerks (against only 16 per cent unskilled blue-collars); see Goarant and Minni (2010) . 10. This report is based on enterprise case studies and also on evidence (from interviews and statistical data) provided by a consulting group specializing in outplacement activity (for workers who were dismissed for 'economic reasons', see above), and which is also a subcontractor of the Public Employment Service for the following-up of hardto-place jobseekers. 11. And also by case studies: for instance, none of the fi rms studied by Alpha (2009) in several sectors (construction, automotive, logistics and retail chains) implemented cuts in basic wages. 12. Collective agreements signed at the industry level are usually extended by law to all the fi rms in the industry, even if they are not members of the employers' organizations that approved the agreement. 13. The second highest being the Netherlands, with about 27 per cent. The proportion is much lower in the other large European countries: about 17 per cent in Spain, 14 per cent in Germany, 8 per cent in the UK and 3 per cent in Italy (Eurofound 2010 ). 14. The new required employment duration is four months during the previous 28 months for workers below 50 years of age (instead of six months during the previous 22 months), and four months during the past 36 months for workers of 50 years of age and over; the maximum duration of insurance benefi t was extended to 28 and 36 months, respectively. 15. Note that since 2007, the Ministry of Employment and the Ministry of Labour and Social Aff airs are two separate entities. 16. Note that, as mentioned above, the labelling is misleading, as benefi ciaries are not unemployed (in the ILO meaning). In most of the cases, employees still work, but their work duration has been reduced and is lower than the legal working time duration (35 hours a week for full-time workers). Even in the case they do not work at all during a period -if their establishment shuts down temporarily, for instance -according to the law, the labour contract still holds, and only its 'implementation is suspended'. 17. ARLD does not replace the standard partial unemployment (PU), but fi rms are strongly encouraged to opt for the new scheme from May 2010, even those that already have an ongoing PU agreement. 18. The WTR was introduced by two laws, named after the Minister of Labour at that time, 'Aubry I' (1997), and 'Aubry II' (1998). 19. Employees work 35 hours a week, on average, throughout the year, but can work, for instance, up to 42 hours in some weeks and 30 hours in other weeks, depending on the workload, without being paid overtime. 20. An establishment must apply to the local administration of the Ministry of Labour for authorization of a given number of days of partial unemployment and for a given number of employees; it must also declare the average duration of partial unemployment per employee. 21. Assessing the use of short-time compensation schemes by fi rms during [2008] [2009] runs up against a serious data problem. First, at the time this chapter was written, the only data available on the number of hours were on 'authorized hours' (not eff ective hours) for the partial unemployment scheme, and no data were available for the Jérôme Gautié -9780857937513 Downloaded from Elgar Online at 07/15/2019 12:22:04PM via free access ARLD scheme. Note that, according to some estimates, before the crisis, on average, only between one-third and half of the authorized hours were eff ectively used by fi rms. 22. Because the fi rm chooses when workers take their days off accumulated in this account. 23. The fi rm can force workers to take days off , even if they have no 'credit' accumulated in their collective account. Each day off is in this case counted as a debit on the collective account. 24. This scheme (as well as the CTP, see also below) provides the jobseeker with a higher replacement rate than the standard unemployment benefi t and with a reinforced follow-up and job search assistance provided by the Public Employment Service. See note 8 for more details. 25. There is also a Social Fund at the temporary agency work industry level, which provides temporary workers with some fi nancial aid (for child care or renting a car to facilitate taking up a job, for instance). Those measures were also extended during the crisis. 26. They are often labelled 'permanent temps'. 27. The CTP is a follow-up scheme for permanent workers laid off 'for economic reasons' -see Section 3.1. 28. The 'Pôle Position' scheme was to last until December 2010. 29. Following Gautié and Schmitt (2010) , a national wage system can be considered 'inclusive' if it relies on formal -and sometimes informal -mechanisms that extend the wages and benefi ts negotiated by workers in industries and occupations with high bargaining power to workers in fi rms and occupations with low bargaining power. These mechanisms include, for instance, the legal minimum wage and the legal extension of collective agreements. 30. As emphasized by the ILO-IMF (2010) discussion paper on the consequences of the crisis, there is some empirical evidence showing that in the United States earnings losses of displaced workers following a recession persist over a 15-20 year period (and may total up to 20 per cent).
